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Relaunching the Gold Standard: 
From Monetary “Anemia’’ to “Plethora’’ and the 
Political Economy of Resumption, 1891-99 
As the Baring Crisis swept over the Argentine economy uncertainty over the 
future course of economic policy grew.  The fiscal  imbalances were readily 
apparent but resolving them would depend on finding the political leadership 
and will to either raise taxes or cut spending. The financial sector continued 
to be a massive drain on the national coffers, and it was  discovered far too 
late that the incentives of the Law of National Guaranteed Banks would prove 
unsustainable. 
Had support of the banks been terminated  a major banking crisis would 
have ensued. In addition to all this, the continued devaluation of the peso, and 
the lack of control over the money supply, indicated a need for an overarching 
monetary reform that could deliver macroeconomic stability and put an end to 
the decades of inflationary turmoil that had beset the republic since its inception. 
Clearly, there would have to be some kind of change in economic policies, but 
at first it was quite unclear what form this would take. 
In this chapter we follow the momentous events of the 1890s, a watershed in 
economic policy. All  these challenges were faced and a new institutional struc- 
ture built that would place the Argentine economy on a firmer footing. Central 
to this discussion will be a continuing analysis of the conflicts at the fiscal- 
monetary policy nexus in a small open economy.  Policymakers realized the 
importance of these tensions, and a resolution of the policy trilemma required 
hard choices. 
Ultimately, a new path took shape and, perhaps unexpectedly, it eventuaUy 
delivered impressive results. The choices were made with a sophisticated con- 
sideration of the tradeoffs-inflation  and deflation risks, external credit market 
reputation, and the problem of making a credible commitment. In the end, by 
aiming to establish a hard convertibility commitment through a currency-board 
arrangement, the Argentine authorities sought to permanently lock monetary 
policy in a realm safely outside political control-and  then throw away the key. 
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Tentative Reforms, 1890-91 
Dr.  Carlos Pellegrini took office as the new president in August 1890 in the 
midst of a chaotic economic and political situation.  On the economic front 
the domestic financial system was  collapsing, the inflation rate was rising to 
disconcerting levels, and the provincial and national governments were on the 
point of defaulting on their debt service obligations.  On the political front, 
despite the suppression of the July revolutionary insurrection, there still lurked 
the threat of another attempted coup d’ktat. 
President  Pellegrini sought to temporize and made an important conces- 
sion to the moderate wing of the Civic Union by appointing two of its most 
prominent affiliates to crucial positions in the Cabinet.  Vicente Fidel Lopez 
was given the finance ministry and Victorino de la Plaza was to serve as the 
middle-man for the renegotiation of the external debt.’  On the positive side 
for Pellegrini, at least all of the factions in the new political coalition agreed on 
the diagnosis that the economy was seriously disrupted by inflation and that 
the public finances were in complete disarray. 
On the downside, the agreement stopped  there-there  was  no consensus 
among congressmen and policymakers on the right course of economic policy 
to address the fundamental fiscal and monetary problems, to overcome the 
ongoing banking crisis, and to resolve the foreign debt shambles.  A graphic 
illustration of the political climate was provided by Pellegrini in his speech to 
the opening session of Congress on May 25, when he remarked that “there is 
great anarchy in opinion about the means to confront the difficulties in which 
we are immersed and this anarchy does not surprise me.”z 
A clear sense of this state of confusion and uncertainty is an important start- 
ing point in our understanding of the stabilization and disinflation experience 
following the Baring Crisis since these political constraints were to leave their 
mark in the design of macroeconomic policy in the early 1890s. 
Fiscal Reforms 
The  fiscal inconsistencies of the old regime had been recognized relatively early, 
but the authorities were slow to act and the problems soon spun out of control. 
Some timid steps to stabilize the real (gold) value of fiscal revenues (collectible 
only in paper) had been taken by the Juarez Celman government.  When the 
paper peso started to depreciate the government’s revenues from trade taxes 
declined, because official duties  (uforos)  were levied according to their paper 
value. In 1889 Congress voted an additional import tax of 15  percent to alleviate 
1. Ferns (1973, p.  454). Alonso (2000) writes of the composition of the cabinet that “officially, 
this was not a coalition government.  The appointments were one of the many conciliatory 
gestures taken by the new government toward the opposition.” 
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Cartoon 5.1. Gloria alos Gobernadores que, en medio de estos horrores, nos dqan sin dos centavos, ffenos 
fos Buncos de clavosy miles de acreedores. (Glory to the governors that, in the middle of these horrors, 
left us not two  cents, left us banks [seats] full of nails and thousands of creditors.) 
Notes:  President Carlos Pellegrini is the puppet master in control, trying to rescue the banks and 
provinces. The  banks and provinces are depicted as full of nails (cfavos), a colloquial term for debts. 
Seat and bank are the same word in Spanish (bunco)-a  play on words. 
Source: Don Quijote, ario 7,  no. 2, August 31,1890. 
the fall in revenues. Fiscal revenues rebounded by 16 percent, only then to fall 
by 30 percent in 1890 (Table 4.2):  In 1890 a new customs law required that 
half of all trade duties should be paid in gold pesos and the rest in paper pesos 
at par. 
In  January 1891  the government finally made a bold fiscal move and new tax 
measures were implemented.  First, custom duties were to be paid in full with 
gold pesos or in equivalent paper pesos at the prevailing paper-gold market rate. 
Second, an ad valorem tax of 4 percent on exports of skins, wool, and meat was 
3. See also Memorius de Hacienda (1890, p. 119) in “Sources of Revenue” under “Adicional de im- 
portacion 15  percent”; and Martinez (1898, p. 522) under “Droit  additionnel a l’importation.” 102  Straining at the Anchor 
Table 5.1. Key FiscalIndicators, 1891-99 
Corrected 
Consumption  Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal  Primary 
Tax Yield  Receipts  Receipts  Expenditure  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit 
Year  (Gold)  (Gold)  (Paper)  (Paper)  (Paper)  (Paper)  (Paper) 
1891  3  20  76  128  52  52  9 
1892  4  34  111  128  17  17  -16 
1893  7  39  125  123  -2  -2  -31 
1894  7  34  122  143  21  4  -36 
1895  8  38  131  166  34  20  -17 
1896  14  44  129  179  50  41  5 
1897  21  52  150  178  28  16  -17 
1898  21  53  137  206  70  70  39 
1899  34  73  164  173  9  9  -49 
Notes andsources: Units are millions of pesos, gold or paper as indicated. See Appendix 1. For the 
period 1894-97,  the corrected service of the debt under the Romero agreement was estimated as 
follows. A 6 percent rate of interest plus amortization was applied to the outstanding stock of 
internal debt denominated in paper pesos. A 4.5 percent interest rate was applied on the internal 
debt denominated in hard currency not including gold bonds related to the Law of National 
Guaranteed Banks. The  external debt service was 1.6 million British pound under the agreement 
plus 1  million gold pesos in payments on performing external bonds not included in the agreement. 
to be imposed temporarily. Third, taxes on consumption were to be introduced, 
for the first time, at the federal level? 
Unfortunately, this effort to address the fiscal problem came a little too late. 
During 1891,  the dramatic real depreciation caused the value of imports to fall 
by half.  Fiscal receipts fell by 31 percent.’  Since import duties represented 
65 percent of total revenues (Table 4.1), tax receipts in gold pesos were bound 
to worsen in the short run. Thus, a full adjustment to a balanced budget as a 
step toward eliminating the inflation tax was clearly infeasible without further 
reforms. For example, in 1891  a balanced budget would have required a cut in 
expenditures, net of interest payments, of 62 percent! 
Moreover, the budget would continue to worsen because the value, in paper 
pesos, of external debt service increased with depreciation. A large part of fiscal 
expenditures were thus indexed to the gold premium.  In 1890, debt service 
amounted to 11.4 million gold pesos, representing 25 percent of expenditures; 
in 1891, debt service payments were 11.6 million, or 34 percent.  Even with 
approximately the same real debt service payments in gold pesos for those two 
years and even holding all  other expenses constant in paper pesos, the 1891 
4. See Memorias de Hacienda (1891, pp. 109-19).  The  report stresses that importers, anticipating 
that the law would pass, invoiced huge amounts of imports in December and January of 1890. 
Thereafter and until the end of the year, the custom revenue was nil. The  custom duty reforms 
of 1891 established that duties should be paid in gold or their equivalent in paper pesos and 
that the schedule of import valuations (farfa  de avaluos) was to be established in gold pesos. 
5. Value of total imports from Appendix 1. 
6. Expenditures net of debt service,  was 84 million paper pesos, and the budget deficit was 52. A 
balanced budget implied a reduction in net expenditures of about 62 percent. See Table 5.1. Relaunching the Gold Standard  103 
level ofexpenditures would have increased by 11.2 percent due to just the paper 
peso depreciation alone.’  In the event, expenditures increased in 1891  by 10.9 
percent because little fiscal adjustment could be accomplished in time. 
Monetary Reforms 
As regards monetary policy reform, the new administration was eager to end the 
devaluation of the currency and impose control over the money supply The  plan 
was to put a stop  to the uncontrolled decentralized emission ofpaper  notes by the 
banks. Instead there would be a centralized authoritywith a national monopoly 
over base money issue. To that end, in October 1890 the Executive Power and 
Congress acted together to settle the currency situation.  They created a new 
institution, the Conversion Office (Caja de Conversion), a body that would 
take the note-issue privilege away from the guaranteed banks and “effect the 
gradual conversion and amortization of the legal tender currency.”8 
The ambitions of the new monetary regime extended even further.  Article 
11 of the Conversion Office charter stated that the government would not only 
aim for price stability of the paper money but also, it was claimed, the paper 
peso would revert to convertibility at its par value with respect to gold: 
Once the amount of  paper notes amortized equals the amount of paper notes issued 
by the Banco Nacional, or when the market value of the fiduciary currency is at par or 
near to par, the Board of Directors of the Bureau of Exchange, in agreement with the 
Executive, shall exchange paper notes for gold, or vice versa, with the aim of fixing the 
value of the fiduciary currency.’ 
Notwithstanding this announced commitment to revalue the currency and re- 
store the gold anchor, there still remained the obvious question ofwhere the real 
resources were to be found to finance the plan-and  here, of course, the pro- 
posals were very unclear. To allow redemption of the paper currency the project 
contemplated the creation of a Conversion Fund. This fund was supposed to 
be financed from three sources:  first, the metallic reserves of the guaranteed 
banks-which,  unfortunately, were almost exhausted at the moment the law 
was passed; second, public funds issued to guarantee paper notes; and third, 
by a vague appeal to “all sums that, by virtue of other legislative acts, might be 
directed to the conversion of bank paper, specially those arising from economies 
in the general budget.”” 
Needless to say,  even with  all these legal and institutional gymnastics to 
redress the currency situation, the short run economic results in 1890  were just 
7.  Since debt service was almost the same in 1890 and 1891, assuming all else constant, the effect 
of the depreciation on expenditures is equal to the product of the 1890 debt service share (0.25) 
and the rate of depreciation (0.448). This equals 0.112. 
8. Caja de Conversion, Ley 2741,7 de octubre de 1890,  Articulo 1. Sabsay (1975, pp. 615-16). 
9.  Sabsay (1975, pp. 615-16). 
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Figure 5.1. Paper-Gold Exchange Rate, 1883-1902 
1883  1885  1887  1889  1891  1893  1895  1897  1899  1901 
No&:  End-of-month data. Units are paper pesos per gold peso 
Source:  Alvarez (1929, p.  122). 
the opposite of those intended. The continued depreciation of the paper peso 
shown in Figure 5.1 was the market's response to a government that, by printing 
money to acquire real resources, turned its back on its own monetary pledge. 
The markets judged that the fiscal reforms did not square with an institutional 
reform that called for tight control of the monetary base. Why  was this so? 
We have found that the path of the exchange rate for the period 1885-99 
can be fairly well explained by a structural model (see Appendix 4).  The model 
includes fundamental variables such as the relative money supplies of Argentina 
and the rest of the world (proxied by the United Kingdom), the relative levels 
of real output, and the relative innovations in the long-term  interest  rates. 
However, when we look at the model's  within-sample  predictions, although 
the 1890 and 1892 predicted depreciation rates are very close to the observed 
rates, for 1891 the prediction of the model is extremely far off the mark. The 
paper peso rate of depreciation predicted  by the fundamentals was  only 4.9 
percent whereas the observed rate was 37 percent." 
This result shows, first, that the proxy we used for the formation of expecta- 
tions, the long-term interest rate, is inadequate.  Second, it implies that when 
11. Recall that the exchange rate model was fitted in first difference form. The predicted  1890 
rate of depreciation was 37.4 percent while the observed rate was 36 percent.  For 1892 the 
predicted rate was -11.9  percent and the observed rate was -12.8  percent. Relaunching the Gold Standard  105 
the “news”  effect is persistent, as it was in 1891, there can be large movements 
in the exchange rate that are not well accounted for by the limited set of funda- 
mentals. Though the exchange rate continued to fall the monetary authorities 
may still have been doing the right things to stop the flight from the paper peso. 
After all, by the end of 1891,  with the help of new foreign capital flows, specif- 
ically the Funding Loan which is discussed in a moment, they had succeeded 
in lowering the rate of growth of the monetary base from 50 percent to about 
6.7 percent. Even so, the public did not yet believe in a regime change.” 
For some evidence on this matter, the monthly quotations  from the for- 
eign exchange market shown in Figure 5.1 are a useful indicator of the public’s 
perceptions of economic policy developments.  When the Pellegrini admin- 
istration took office in August 1890 the gold peso stood at 2.65 paper pesos. 
By the third quarter of 1891,  with gold at 4.21 paper pesos, a return to parity 
must have looked like a very remote possibility. Negative short-run reaction in 
the foreign exchange market could have reflected the grave uncertainties at the 
time reforms were begun. The  “news”  relevant to the formation of expectations 
regarding the future policy regime was, for a while, the driving force pushing 
the market exchange rate well above its fundamental determinants. 
12. A simple example illustrates the problem of divergence between economic policy facts and 
market beliefs, that is to say, a multiple equilibria problem.  Assume, for example, a Cagan- 
type of money demand that is a function of the expected depreciation rate and suppose that 
purchasing power parity prevails with stable foreign prices in the short run such that, without 
loss of generality, p:  = log F‘;  = 0.  Then domestic prices are equal to the exchange rate 
pt =  et and domestic inflation is equal to the rate of depreciation Etef+l -  et =  Etpr+l -pt. 
Hence, the domestic demand for money can be written as 
where a > 0,  mt  is the paper money stock at time t ,  et is the exchange rate at time t,  and Et 
is the expectation operator at time t. Suppose now that the expected evolution of the paper 
money stock is given by 
Etm,+l  =  Etmm,+2  =  Etmt+3 = . .  . = (1 -  @)mt  +  @(mt  +  6) 
Here, the money stock is expected to be fixed from next period onward and is equal to a linear 
combination of the current paper money stock and a higher stock b > 0 with the weights being 
their respective expected probabilities. Solving recursively for et in terms of my  yields 
This expression states that in the short run the exchange rate et may differ from its fundamental, 
the actual money stock mt ,  if the probability @ assigned to a higher money stock mt +  b in the 
near future is strongly positive. If the market belief was that, despite all the intended reforms, 
the inflationary regime would persist for a while, then a higher probability would have been 
attached to a higher future money stock, and the larger would have been the deviation of the 
exchange rate from its fundamental.  For a discussion of the determination of the exchange 
rate with an emphasis on the role of “news” see Frenkel (1981) and Dornbusch (1983). The 
problem of a divergence between economic policy facts and market beliefs concerning the risk 
of a discrete devaluation is sometimes called thepesoproblem. See also Lizondo (1983). 106  Straining at the Anchor 
The External Debt 
To  take pressure off the foreign exchange market, the government attempted 
to roll over the service of its external debt. They sought a one-year moratorium 
in the form of a Funding Loan of four million pounds, but negotiations were 
interrupted when, in November 1890, Barings bank failed.I3 Finally, though, 
their efforts paid  off when, on January 23, 1891, the Argentine  negotiator 
Victorino de la Plaza finally signed a much larger contract with a syndicate of 
merchant banks in a deal coordinated by the Bank of England. The agreement 
granted the government a 6 percent funding loan of fifteen million pounds to 
cover the full service of external debt over the following three years. 
As might be expected, the external loan was conditional on several provisions, 
the most severe of these placing clear constraints on the conduct of domestic 
monetary policy.  Admittedly,  the Conversion Office had adopted currency 
contraction  as a desired aim of policy to be  achieved at some point in time. 
Article 16 of the Funding Loan agreement was much more explicit, and set 
a precise redemption timetable:  the Conversion Office would have to retire 
each year, for three consecutive years, fifteen million pesos of bank notes from 
circulation-cumulatively  about 20 percent of monetary 
Thus, with a tighter monetary policy in sight, in April 1891  the government 
decided to suspend the convertibility of deposits into currency at the official 
banks. The banks were already suffering a severe drain of deposits, and it was 
announced that substantial reforms in the banking system would be enacted. 
To  that end, in October 1891, Congress created a new bank out of the ruins 
of the old Banco Nacional called the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina (BNA),  a 
“semipublic”  institution. It  was intended that the Banco de la Nacion Argentina 
be established with an initial private capital base of fifty million pesos and shares 
were to be offered for public subscription. 
This plan was derailed when the share issue failed: investors, if there were any 
at all, regarded the project with deep apprehension and abstained from buying 
any shares. Ultimately the government “backed” the capital base with fictitious 
claims that were created by converting the bank into a state institution.  TO 
give a flavor of the market climate and the reaction to the project consider the 
opinion of the correspondent to The  Economist newspaper in a column published 
on November 28: 
The new Bank of the Argentine Nation will open its doors to the public on the 9th 
[of December].  Its 50 million of inconvertible notes will rapidly get into circulation, 
as the provision for issuing them in series of  ten millions is merely a blind, and the 
inevitable economic result of a battle between coin and inconvertible and depreciated 
paper currency must issue. The imported gold will be driven away faster than it came, 
and our currency will be in a worse plight than ever. 
13. Williams (1920, pp.  117-18). 
14. Data from Memonm de  Hacienda (1891, Anexo 15,  pp. 4340). Relaunching the Gold Standard  107 
Cartoon 5.2. Hacer  un  mate sin yerba  es algo dzjici(,  pero hacerfo chupar:  “that is the yuestion.”  (To 
make a mate without herbs is something difficult, but to make it drinkable: that is the question.) 
Notes: This cartoon is a critique of the plan to rescue the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina. President 
Carlos Pellegrini holds a mate with the label Banco de la Naci6n; the lady is public confidence, 
expressing her lack of faith in the plan. Broken mates lie on the floor. The  kettle is labeled /a mision 
(the  mission to London?) and the stove is labeled the Congress. The  container for  yerba and sugar 
lies empty on the table, an allusion to the parlous state of the bank‘s balance sheet. 
Source:  El mosyuito, atio 29, no. 1491, August 16,1891. 
Why was  the market afraid of the Banco de la Nacion Argentina initiative? 
There were reasonable fears that the banking project would degenerate into 
cronyism and political manipulation, as in  previous experiences  with state banks. 
But the architects of the plan were not unaware of such fears and took care to 
make the institutional design more robust.  There were a couple of clauses 
intended to prevent abuse of the bank by the state. 
First, in an effort to separate commercial banking functions from government 
finances, the project put severe limits on the amount of credit that could be 
extended to the federal treasury.  Specifically, rules stated that the Banco de la 108  Straining at the  Anchor 
Nacion “may  not lend money to any public power or municipality other than the 
national government, whose credit with the Bank must not exceed two million 
pesos” (Article 12). Furthermore, the bank “would not use deposits as funding 
for public loans” (Article 14). 
Second, minimum reserve requirements were imposed on the bank to prevent 
the money creation associated with excessive credit expansion. Originally, re- 
serves equal to a minimum of 25  percent of total deposits were to be maintained 
in the vaults of the bank. In  June 1892,  a new decree established that additional 
reserves, a “guaranteed fund,” equivalent to 75 percent of private deposits were 
to be deposited at the Conversion Office.” 
Decisive Reforms, 1892-99 
In short, by mid-1891 a package of measures had implemented deep reforms 
of fiscal and monetary policy.  There had been a large tax reform. There was 
a draconian adjustment in the banking regime centering on the liquidation of 
the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.  A new 
independent body had been established to  control the monetary base. And,  with 
these reforms afoot, there had been a successful renegotiation of the repayment 
schedule for the external government debt.  We  now discuss the short-run 
response of the Argentine economy to this stabilization attempt. 
The tentative reforms of 1890-91 were incapable of cementing in place ex- 
pectations of a new stable regime. But the beginning of 1892  marked a turning 
point in the public’s beliefs about the viability of the reform package. The  cause 
of the reversal of expectations was the widespread conviction that Luis Saenz 
Pefia, an advocate for fiscal retrenchment, would be elected the next president 
of the Republic for the term from 1892 to 1898: 
When in February 1892, it became known that Dr.  Saenz Pefia, a highly esteemed 
member of the Supreme Court, was to be the next President, the premium  declined 
forty points within  a month, and there were those who said that the gold premium 
depended simply on political conditions.. .. The paper peso would surely appreciate 
under wise political treatment; public confidence is a powerful factor in a depreciated 
paper situation, though scarcely sufficient to make a paper peso worth $0.25 become the 
equal of $1  gold without other forces cooperating.” 
Saenz Pefia’s appointment as the new constitutional president of Argentina in 
October 1892  seemed to calm the nervous expectations ofArgentina’s economic 
agents and bolster the viability of the economic reform package. 
The confirmation  as finance minister of Juan JosC  Romero, an outspoken 
defender of convertibility and the gold standard, then produced a further rapid 
15. Charter ofthe Banco de la Nacion, from Tornquist (1919, pp. 311-12).  Decree ofJune 1892, 
16. Williams (1920, p.  141). Here was a clear example of the “news”  effect at work. 
from Banco de la Naci6n Argentina, Memorius (1892, p. 3). Relaunching the Gold Standard  109 
appreciation in the value of the paper peso on the foreign exchange market. 
Judged by market sentiment, policy was finally headed in the right direction. 
Critically, Romero understood  that the monetary policy goal, in this case an 
eventual return to the gold standard, could not be achieved without ensuring 
coordination and consistency with fiscal policy and without better management 
of the external debt." 
The External Debt 
Romero disliked the terms of the 1891 Funding Loan, the centerpiece of the 
de la Plaza-Bank of England agreement. Instead he proposed to the Rothschild 
Committee,  another bank syndicate, that Argentina should pay its external 
obligations based on its own fiscal capacity and not on new loans from outside 
financed at high interest rates. Romero feared that Argentina would end up in 
a Ponzi scheme, that is, an unsustainable schedule for debt payments based on 
perpetual rollovers where the level of debt explodes in the long run: 
If [the government] were to satisfy all the obligations of the internal and external public 
debt, as well as the sum total of the guarantees, all  the revenues of the Nation would 
scarcely suffice to cover those services alone.. .  .  We are paying our debts by creating daily 
a more burdensome debt for the Nation-a  disastrous system which should be put to 
an end." 
Thus followed a new round of negotiations, the result of which came to be 
called the Romero Agreement. Under the new terms, Argentina was granted a 
more generous rescheduling ofits debt service: first, between 1893  and 1898  the 
government was required to pay half the level of original debt service recognized 
in the de la Plaza-Bank of England agreement; second, from 1898 it would pay 
the full level of debt service; and third, from 1901 the government would begin 
to amortize principal as well. Under this new arrangement the short-run shock 
to fiscal policy was alleviated and the government would have ample time to 
anticipate and plan for the increased future payments. 
As Romero intended, the plan eliminated the possibility of an explosive debt 
situation. To show that this was a real possibility, let us consider the government 
budget constraint and assume that there is  an ongoing deficit DEF, that is 
entirely bond financed. In this case the change in the stock of debt Bt  can be 
expressed as 
Bt -  B,-1  =  DEF, + rtBt-l,  (5.1) 
17. It is interesting here to note that Romero, an economic conservative, was  a member of the 
Union Civica party and in December 1889 he had been  part of the so-called Revolutionary 
Junta that plotted the overthrow of President Juirez Celman (Alonso 2000, p. 61). 
18. Shepherd (1933, pp. 39-40). 110  Straining at  the Anchor 
Table 5.2. The Burdensome Funding Loan Agreement 
Interest  Rate  Output  Coefficient  Debt-Output 
Year  Nominal  Real  Growth Rate  (l+r)/(l+g)  Ratio (%) 
1891  10.3  6.6  -11.0  1.20  72 
1892  9.9  16.2  8.6  1.07  90 
1893  8.9  10.8  5.0  1.06  91 
Notes and sources:  See text.  The interest rate of the Funding Loan is calculated as the stated 6 
percent interest rate on the bond, divided by the average price quotation of the bond from The 
South American Journal.  The real interest rate is calculated as (1 + i)/(l  + x*) -  1,  where  i is 
the interest rate and x*  is the world inflation rate proxied by the U.K. Board ofTrade price index 
from Mitchell (1971, p.  476). The  rate of output growth is the annual rate of change of the real 
activity index as in Appendix 1. The coefficient (1 + r)/(l +g)  is as described in the text. The 
figures for the stock of debt are from Appendix 1. 
where 
Bt  =  real debt (in constant pesos); 
DEFt  =  real primary deficit (in constant pesos); 
rt  =  real interest rate. 
Assume that real output Yt grows at an exogenous rate g,  so that 
Y, = (1  +g)Yt-1.  (5.2) 
It is then easy to see that the debt-output ratio has dynamics given by 
Bt  1 +  r Bt-l  1  DEF,  +--  -  -  ~~  - 
Y,  l+gYt-1  l+g  Yt-1  (5.3) 
This first-order difference equation implies that the debt-output ratio BIY will 
grow indefinitely in Ponzi fashion so long as the red rate ofinterest exceeds the 
real growth rate of the ec~nomy.’~ 
The  figures in Table 5.2 indicate that Argentine debt service was rolled over 
at extremely high real interest rates. The high rates are explained, in part, by 
the low credit rating of the Argentine government in European capital markets 
after the crash; and, as a result, the bonds of the Funding Loan could only be 
floated at heavy discounts in excess of forty percent.  In addition, the steady 
world deflation of the 1891-95 period augmented the real rate of interest still 
further. With the benefit of hindsight we can now see why Finance Minister 
Romero felt that the 1891 Funding Loan agreement was a “disastrous system” 
that needed to be stopped. 
Monetary Reforms 
When it came to exchange-rate stabilization, Romero favored the idea ofletting 
the market value of the paper peso appreciate, but he opposed any policy of 
19. For analysis of debt, deficits and debt restructuring see Blanchard (1983) and Sjaastad (1983). Relaunching the Gold Standard  111 
Table 5.3. Selected Statistics, 1891-99 
Price  Paper-Gold  Real  Average of  Money 
Money  Money  Level  Exchange  Output  Exports &  Velocity 
Year  Rase  Supply  (1886=100)  Rate  Index  Imports  Variant 1  Variant 2 
1891  261  417  253  3.74  6,535  89  3.08  100 
1892  282  387  201  3.29  7,113  108  2.88  115 
1893  307  415  189  3.24  7,466  113  2.64  110 
1894  299  419  185  3.58  8,040  119  2.76  127 
1895  297  435  221  3.44  8,093  135  3.19  133 
1897  293  440  194  2.91  8,198  124  2.82  103 
1896  295  437  187  2.96  8,768  144  2.93  122 
1898  292  443  187  2.57  8,888  159  2.93  115 
1899  291  463  161  2.25  9,666  184  2.62  112 
Notes andsources: Money base and money supply in millions of paper pesos. Real output index in 
millions of 1950 pesos. Exports and imports in milhons of gold pesos. Velocity variant 1  is real 
output multiplied by the paper-gold  exchange rate and divided by the money supply. Velocity 
variant 2 (an index with 1891=100) is the average of exports and imports multiplied by the 
paper-gold exchange rate and divided by the money supply, All  series from Appendix 1. 
withdrawing paper pesos from circulation in order to accelerate deflation and 
push the paper peso toward par.  In a November  1892 report prepared for 
President Saenz Peiia, he declared that 
In spite of the quantity of money in circulation, an appreciation in its value is occurring 
with an unusual speed, and this, without doubt, is an encouraging sign for the country’s 
economic future.  But we  should not forget that the higher  the value of the paper 
currency in circulation, the greater the amount of gold that will be needed for its eventual 
convertibility. It seems to me that it is appropriate to mention that the administration 
of Dr.  Pellegrini put forward the idea of restoring convertibility at [a devalued gold 
premium of] 250 percent. The rate that was suggested by the Pellegrini administration 
for a future conversion is, I believe, a fair rate and a convenient one for the country, 
and it seems to me that prudence recommends urgent and serious consideration on this 
important matter.2O 
Unfortunately, even with Romero’s willingness to consider convertibility at a 
weaker parity, the plan was  not workable because the Conversion Office had 
no specie reserves and the government was not in a position  to negotiate  a 
gold-based loan that could serve as initial backing for the paper peso. 
The figures in the first column ofTable 5.3 indicate that the monetary base 
increased by 7.7 percent  in  1892 and by 8.9 percent  in 1893, but then fell 
steadily from 1893 to 1899 by an average compounded rate of 0.9 percent per 
year. The  initial increase in the monetary base did not augment liquidity in the 
money market because the Banco de la Nacion’s legal reserve requirements, and 
the private banks’ desires to build up reserves after the crash, had an offsetting 
effect through the money multiplier. 
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Table 5.4. Monetary Ratios, 1891-99 
Reserve Ratio 
Currency  Reserve  Banco de  Other  Money 
Year  Ratio  Ratio  la Nacion  Banks  Multiplier 
1891  0.50  0.26  0.03  0.36  1.59 
1892  0.49  0.47  0.58  0.45  1.37 
1893  0.45  0.53  0.89  0.42  1.35 
1894  0.41  0.51  0.84  0.41  1.40 
1895  0.38  0.48  0.79  0.40  1.47 
1896  0.38  0.48  0.66  0.43  1.48 
1897  0.38  0.46  0.66  0.41  1.50 
1898  0.36  0.47  0.70  0.40  1.52 
1899  0.35  0.43  0.62  0.38  1.59 
Notes and sources: See Appendix 1. 
Further details of the monetary developments of the 1890s are shown in 
Table 5.4.  The broad  money supply increased secularly during 1892-99  by 
an  average annual rate of 2.6 percent,  a modest increase in a time  of rapid 
economic growth when compared to the 21.1 percent rate experienced during 
the 1880s boom years.  The velocity index (Table 5.3, column 6) displays a 
somewhat erratic behavior throughout the deflationary period.  The evidence 
suggests that three distinct patterns can be observed. First, there was a period of 
profound decline invelocity through 1893  and then, after an upward adjustment 
in 1894 and 1895, a period of almost constant velocity with a slight declining 
trend toward the end of the period. 
Romero’s objectives for stable monetary policy were ultimately achieved. The 
period 1892-99 was characterized by only the slightest rate of monetary expan- 
sion, at least if we omit the monetary expansion used to fund the Banco de la 
Nacion Argentina. Essentially,  the monetary policy rule used by the Conversion 
Office amounted to setting a fixed monetary rule a la Friedman?’ 
Fiscal Reforms 
On  the fiscal side the crucial adjustments were achieved during Romero’s tenure, 
allowing the treasury to post surpluses for four consecutive years from 1892. In 
reality, given its monetary policy commitment, the government was practically 
forced to equilibrate the budget after the debacle of 1891-92  and in the face 
of tightening credit conditions in both the domestic and international markets. 
With no ability to issue debt issue, and the inflation tax off limits, the deficits 
had to be eliminated. 
The figures in Table 5.1 show that the state of public finances improved 
markedly from 1892  to 1894. The  government moved toward a balanced budget 
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and into surplus. Increased taxation and a sharp improvement in the gold value 
of fiscal revenues were the important sources of fiscal adjustment, rather than 
cuts in the level of fiscal expenditures. The  healthy state of public finances was 
weakened in 1895-98 by the impending threat of a border war with Chile. This 
territorial dispute in southern Patagonia caused a spectacular surge in military 
expenditures, but by then confidence in capital markets had been restored and, 
remarkably, the 1895-98 deficits were entirely financed with internal debt and 
short-term foreign loans, and there was no recourse to the printing press?' 
Recovery with Deflation 
Although the postcrash era was a contractionary time for fiscal and monetary 
policy, the country's economic agents had anticipated both developments, and, 
far from retarding the economy, the stabilization was accompanied by a remark- 
ably rapid economic recovery. An average annual real rate of growth of nearly 5 
percent was achieved in this decade in the years after the crash. This was a very 
high growth rate for the late nineteenth century by international standards, and 
it put Argentina on a course to restore its very high rates of long-run growth.'3 
In 1892,  with expectations stabilized and business activity on the rise, there 
was an increase in the quantity of money demanded that could only be accom- 
modated by a 21 percent decline in domestic prices and a large appre~iation.2~ 
After this big adjustment in 1892,  the paper-gold exchange rate fluctuated be- 
tween 3.2 and 3.6 from 1892 to 1894. From then on it declined at a very rapid 
pace, a cumulative decline of 37.1  percent in five years from 1894  to 1899. The 
exchange rate fell from 3.75 paper pesos per gold peso in 1891  to 2.27 in 1899 
under a pure float (Figure 5.1). 
With a tight monetary base and accelerating economic growth, the income 
velocity of money could only remain constant or even decline with a protracted 
deflation in the paper-gold exchange rate and in domestic prices. The  real econ- 
omy recovered and grew even when there was a deflation and an appreciation 
of the currency. This period of monetary stability was also a time of recovery 
for the banking sector. The broad money supply expanded by 18  percent due 
to an increase in the money multiplier, a marked turn around in the process of 
22. Defense expenditures rose from 27.8 million paper pesos to 53.8 million in 1895,63.5 million 
in 1896,38.8 million in 1897, and 85.5 million in 1898. See Appendix 1. Short-term foreign 
loans were advanced by Deutsche Bank of Berlin, Disconto Gescheshaft, and Baring Brothers 
during 1895-97 in the sum of 24 million gold pesos. See Martinez (1898, pp. 303-11). 
23. The 5 percent growth rate  compares with a (probably unsustainable) 8.5 percent rate that 
prevailed in the precrash boom years of the 1880s, and it is only slightly inferior to the rates of 
growth characteristic of the gold standard years 1900-1913. 
24. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) report that European grain crops failed in the summer of 1891 
producing a sizeable increase in international crop demand. For Argentina, this represented a 
chance to increase world market share in crops by a switch in export mix.  In 1888, the value 
share ofwheat, corn, and linseed in total exports, was 15 percent; by 1892-93 it was already 31 
percent.  See CortCs Conde (1979, pp. 90-91). 114  Straining at the Anchor 
financial deepening for the official banks after the Baring Crisis had seen a fall 
of 34 percent in the money multiplier in 1889-91 (Table 5.4). 
It is also important  to note that the Argentine recovery occurred in the middle 
of an international recession.  In 1892-94  international prices were at their 
lowest level in the years of the so-called “Great Depression” that characterized 
large parts of the world economy from 1870 to 1895.2’ This global deflation was 
quickly transmitted to the very open Argentine economy through the market 
for goods:  between  1891 and 1894, for example, while the nominal rate of 
foreign exchange appreciated 3.1 percent  annually, domestic prices fell by  a 
faster annual rate of 9.3 percent. 
The international macroeconomic scene changed radically in 1895. An in- 
crease in global monetary liquidity resulted from an increase in the world stock 
of  gold. This increase was due to a various factors, among them new discoveries 
of gold deposits and a series of technological advances in the refining of the pre- 
cious metal. After 1894,  the international inflation had an effect on Argentina: 
in the subperiod 1894-99 domestic prices declined by only 12.8 percent despite 
an even greater appreciation of the paper peso by 37.1 percent. 
The  Political Economy of Deflation 
Argentina’s monetary authorities had been successful in fwng the quantity of 
money and in allowing the value of money to be freely determined by the 
exchange markets. As a result of this extraordinarily restrictive monetary policy 
a debate began around 1897 as to whether a return to a convertible monetary 
regime would be advisable or not. Once again, the conflict over economic policy 
centered on  whether the paper peso should be convertible at its traditional par or 
at an exchange rate set by the markets. Urban sectors and commercial interests 
favored a convertibility plan with the old par, while exporters and industrial 
sectors called for a devalued 
What was the distributional  impact of the deflation on different interest 
groups? We constructed various measures shown in Table 5.5. An Argentine 
export profitability index is measured by the paper-gold exchange rate, mul- 
tiplied by the ratio of the external price of exports to the rural money wages. 
Rural money wages are used as a proxy for the export sector’s variable produc- 
tion costs. The  figures suggest that the 1892-94world depression was the main 
cause of the decline in the profitability index.  In the last half of the decade, 
25. Although Britain, for example, escaped most of this deflation, peripheral and settler economies 
suffered greatly. The economic suffering led to political pressure at times for a change in mon- 
etary regime. In 1893 a major financial crisis occurred in the United States when expectations 
arose that the gold standard would be abandoned due to political pressure from silver standard 
advocates (Friedman and Schwartz 1963,  pp. 89-134;  Eichengreen 1996; Frieden 1988; 1997). 
26. Ford (1962). Such intersectoral conflicts  were seen elsewhere. See Eichengreen (1992a; 1992b) 
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Table 5.5. Urban-Rural Welfare  Measures and Interest Rates, 1891-99 
Export  Percent  Percent  Urban Wages 
Profitability  Change in  Change in  Index of  Deflated by  Yield on Domestic 
Index  Terms of  U.K.  Food  Wholesale  Internal  Rate of 
Year  (1891=100)  Trade  Prices  Prices  Prices  Bond  Inflation 

















-8.6  -5.4  117 
-7.0  -1.7  115 
-11.1  -5.9  108 
52.2  -3.0  98 
-3.3  -2.8  105 
10.0  2.2  147 
12.3  3.5  201 









9.2  -21 
8.7  -6 
8.9  -2 
8.3  20 
7.7  -15 
7.8  4 
7.9  -4 
7.9  -14 
Nates and  sources:  All series from Appendix 1 unless otherwise stated.  The export profitability 
index is the implicit international price of exports multiplied by the paper-gold  exchange rate 
divided by the nominal rural wage (the latter from CortCs Conde 1979, p.  228). U.K. Board of 
Trade price index from Mitchell (1971, p.  476). Nominal urban wages and prices of food from 
CortCs Conde (1979, pp.  230 and 226).  Domestic rate of inflation is the rate of change of the 
wholesale price index. 
the trend of the profitability index is less clear: monetary forces made the peso 
appreciate, but this was offset by a rise in world agricultural prices. 
For the urban sector we show a real wage index consisting of urban wages 
deflated by a wholesale price index. It is apparent that urban real wages steadily 
rose after 1895,  but real forces that improved labor’s marginal productivity may 
have played an important role in addition to the monetary deflationary forces. 
A rise in the relative price of labor and a fall in export profitability may just 
reflect a “normal” pattern of changing economic conditions in this newly settled 
country. We  doubt that a mere change in the nominal exchange-rate regime 
would have a persistent effect on the equilibrium values of these real variables. 
Aside from distributional conflict, the most notable argument against defla- 
tion focused on the economy-wide distortions arising in the credit market due 
to the zero nominal interest rate floor. The argument originates in the work of 
the little-known Argentine political economist Silvio Gesell (1862-1930).  In 
his two most famous articles entitled “Monetary Anemia” (1898) and “Mone- 
tary Plethora” (1909), Gesell identified the problem of the debt-deflation trap, 
anticipating Irving Fisher’s famous work by almost thirty years: 
If money gets more expensive, debts increase in exact proportion to the rise in the cost 
of money. Nominally nothing changes, hut materially the debt load increases. With the 
prospect of having to pay triple what one received, who will dare go into debt to start 
a new industry in the country?. .  .  .  The increase in the value of money is  the common 
cause for all the country’s economic troubles. ..” 
27.  See Gesell (1898; 1909). Note the discussion on pp. 20-23.  See also Fisher (1933a). 116  Straining at  the  Anchor 
Gesell had the brilliant insight that in a monetary economy there is an essential 
asymmetry between inflationary and deflationary regimes.  In an inflationary 
economy, nominal interest rates usually incorporate an expected-inflation com- 
ponent. Thus, they can freely adjust upward to reflect expected future changes 
in the purchasing power of the currency. Conversely, in an economy in which 
prices are falling the nominal interest rate cannot fully adjust to absorb such 
expectations since it cannot become negative. 
What empirical evidence is  available to investigate the Gesell hypothesis? 
Curiously enough, the behavior of interest rates in this period has received no 
attention in the previous literature.  The nominal interest rate, proxied by the 
yield of long-term  internal bonds, showed a marked downward trend over the 
period; yet, meanwhile, domestic prices were falling rapidly, resulting in very 
high real interest rates that were rising in the 1890s (Table 5.5). 
In this environment a shift toward more expansionary monetary policies-in 
the form of resumption at the prevailing market exchange rate-appeared  to be a 
wise course of action. It  could have saved the economy from a protracted period 
of high real interest rates that worked to the detriment of finance, investment, 
and economic growth.  If such was  the case,  why did the government  not 
embrace such a devaluation to a new parity sooner, rather than waiting until 
the late 1890s to adopt a definitive convertibility plan at a new parity? 
At least two counterfactual policy options could be considered. As we have 
noted, a first option would have been to adopt convertibility in 1893,  accommo- 
dating the devaluation with a high exchange rate for the paper peso as Pellegrini 
and Romero had suggested. However, to have implemented convertibility then, 
in a scenario of unfavorable expectations and great uncertainty, the government 
would have needed a very credible commitment. Lacking reserves, they would 
have required a large foreign loan in specie to provide the necessary backing 
for the monetary base. It is very hard to imagine that in 1893 the government 
had the solvency and bargaining capacity to get such a loan in the international 
market. We have seen that the Funding Loan of 1891 afforded only relatively 
small sums at high real interest rates. Hence, our pessimistic view of this option 
seems reasonable once we recognize that a very large loan, at least 20 million 
pounds sterling, would have been needed to achieve total bachng for the coun- 
try’s monetary base, and we recall that the Funding Loan of 1891 had been 
granted to save Argentina from a default situation and not as a line of credit to 
increase the treasury’s specie reserves. 
A second option would have been the adoption of a higher rate of monetary 
expansion in order to accommodate the monetary needs of a growing economy, 
thus avoiding any further deflationary pressure. In principle, this policy could 
have been followed under a convertibility system or one of a flexible exchange 
rate, although only under the latter with any effectiveness in the long run. In 
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represented an optimum monetary policy in the Gesell-Friedman  sense if the 
authorities set a target of stable prices. However, it would have depended on 
a series of unlikely assumptions.  First, the government had to have had the 
relevant information and the technical and legal flexibility to know at what 
speed it should inject money into the economy; and second, economic agents, 
just beginning to recover from the catastrophic crisis of 1891, would have to 
have perceived correctly the government’s intentions to neutralize deflationary 
pressures and not instead see a monetary expansion as yet another return to an 
inflationary scenario. A floating exchange-rate regime of this kind was probably 
unthinkable in a period dominated by a rigid policymaking menta/iti that  prized 
above all adherence to the gold standard, a fixed exchange rate system. 
In the early 1890s,  then, the prevailing economic doctrines mandated a return 
to convertibility at par and not to a nominal exchange rate at a level higher than 
par. At  first, Argentina was to make its best effort to play by these rules even if, 
at the end of the day, an accommodation to a new parity was unavoidable. Thus, 
after struggling with deflation for almost a decade, the policy goal was finally 
changed in 1899. The arguments of Gesell, and the export lobby, held sway 
and a new parity was  adopted that matched the prevailing market exchange 
rate of 2.27 paper pesos per gold peso. The need for further deflation was over 
and, with macroeconomic stability restored, the long-awaited opening of the 
Conversion Office for normal exchange operations could go ahead. The stage 
was set for Argentina’s resumption of gold standard convertibility. 